It does seem preciso show, as the objector says, that identity is logically prior esatto ordinary similarity relations
Reply: This is verso good objection. However, the difference between first-order and higher-order relations is relevant here. Traditionally, similarity relations such as quantitativo and y are the same color have been represented, sopra the way indicated durante the objection, as higher-order relations involving identities between higher order objects (properties). Yet this treatment may not be inevitable. Con Deutsch (1997), an attempt is made sicuro treat similarity relations of the form ‘\(x\) and \(y\) are the same \(F\)’ (where \(F\) is adjectival) as primitive, first-order, purely logical relations (see also Williamson 1988). If successful, verso first-order treatment of similarity would esibizione that the impression that identity is prior onesto equivalence is merely per misimpression – paio esatto the assumption that the usual higher-order account of similarity relations is the only option.
Objection 6: If on day 3, \(c’ = s_2\), as the text asserts, then by NI, the same is true on day 2. But the text also asserts that on day 2, \(c = s_2\); yet \(c \ne c’\). This is incoherent.
Objection 7: The notion of correspondante identity is incoherent: “If verso cat and one of its proper parts are one and the same cat, what is the mass of that one cat?” (Burke 1994)
Reply: Young Oscar and Old Oscar are the same dog, but it makes niente affatto sense sicuro ask: “What is the mass of that one dog.” Given the possibility of change, identical objects may differ durante mass. On the correspondante identity account, that means that distinct logical objects that are the same \(F\) may differ mediante mass – and may differ with respect esatto verso host of other properties as well. Oscar and Oscar-minus are distinct physical objects, and therefore distinct logical objects. (more…)